

T con Zero - Forty-second issue:

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Value at Risk and Work in Progress




Corporate bond yields are at lower levels than in the past. Is there a danger that they reflect too-optimistic expectations and may expose investors to unexpected risks? To answer, better adopt different approaches and different perspectives.

It ain't what you don't know that gets you into trouble. It's what you know for sure that just ain't so. This famous quote, dubiously attributed to the brilliant Mark Twain¹, should warn us against one of the main risks of our time and of the investment business: The fact that we have learned to estimate risk with increasingly sophisticated systems does not mean that its measurement is certain, nor that we can be sure that we can control it or avoid it.

It sounds simple, but it's a hard lesson to learn. On the other hand, measuring risk, to try to manage it the best we can, is a necessary activity for those involved in investing - anywhere. And in particular when dealing with bonds, which today offer increasingly compressed returns, it is essential to assess whether the risk/return profile of an investment opportunity is attractive or not, or suitable for customers.


Let's take corporate bonds as an important example. When their returns were more generous, some observers just looked at them. And in a world of declining sovereign returns, this was enough to attract some investors to the asset class. Then they moved to spreads. When spreads began to appear compressed, I personally tried to estimate the probabilities of default-implied spreads. In practice, over a certain period of time, I calculated the probability of default for the bonds that are part of a risky index that would make me indifferent - that is, at the end of the period would give me the same return - compared to the investment in a government bond, considered a "risk-free" asset. The higher the implied probability of default, in historical perspective, the higher the degree of skepticism embedded in valuations and prices. Today, it is still at a level close to the times of acute financial distress (compare right and left side of **chart 1**).



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Chart 1: 5-year default probability implied in investment grade corporate spreads

Euro and US IG: 5Y probability of default implied in spreads



Source: ICE Bofa ML, Bloomberg, author analysis. Data as at Sept. 30, 2020


Then this analysis was enriched by the Value at Risk, known by its acronym, VaR. In short, it is a risk-estimation methodology that tells us how much we could lose over a certain time horizon with a certain level of confidence - in a statistical sense. The easiest way to think of VaR is with a positive spin. For example, a portfolio that has a VaR of -2% with a 99% confidence level over one week is a portfolio that in 99% of the weeks, statistically should return -2% or better (and conversely only in 1% of the weeks, the most unfavorable ones, should return losses of -2% or worse).

The VaR is based on a number of assumptions that do not always occur. That is why, in some circumstances, investors have suffered far greater losses than VaR proposed. An obvious example was the Great Financial Crisis, but it was not the only one. We can talk about “black swans”, but it is also - perhaps above all - a paradigm for observing the world that has not been conforming to reality. It is a fascinating subject, but this is not the right time to get into it. VaR has limitations, which have emerged especially in the case of the most volatile financial assets, such as equities. Nevertheless, it is a very useful instrument, and it can complement other information we have about more relatively stable financial assets, such as bonds.

The VaR for US investment grade bonds, for example, showed a possibility of losses early in the pandemic correction, which had never occurred before, not even in the Great Financial Crisis of 2008 (chart 2, VaR over one week, 99% confidence level). For the riskier high yield universe, however, the peaks observed in March - April 2020 are just below those of 2008 (chart 3). The closer to zero the possibility of losses estimated by VaR, the lower the implied level of concern investors display.

Chart 2: Value at Risk (VaR) for ICE BofA ML Corporate Investment Grade USA Index, one week, 99%


Value at Risk (one week, 99%) US investment grade



Source: ICE Bofa ML, Bloomberg, author analysis. Data as at Sept. 25, 2020

Chart 3: Value at Risk (VaR) for ICE BofA ML Corporate High Yield USA Index

Value at Risk (one week, 99%) US high yield




Source: ICE BofA ML, Bloomberg, author analysis. Data as at Sept. 25, 2020

In the Euro area, the picture is similar.

Chart 4: Value at Risk (VaR) for ICE BofA ML Corporate Investment Grade Euro Index


Value at Risk (one week, 99%) Euro investment grade



Source: ICE BofA ML, Bloomberg, author analysis. Data as at Sept. 25, 2020

Chart 5: Value at Risk (VaR) for the ICE BofA ML Corporate High Yield Euro Index

Value at Risk (one week, 99%) Euro high yield




Source: ICE BofA ML, Bloomberg, author analysis. Data as at Sept. 25, 2020

If we focus on the current situation, we note that the VaR is close to zero, but still within a range in which it has historically traded most of the time over the last 26 years for corporate bonds, both investment grade (**Chart 6**) and high yield (**Chart 7**). The two charts are a zoom-in of the previous ones with a filter, and they show how long the VaR has been under a threshold one could deem "reasonably low": 0.25% for the investment grade US and 0.10% for the Euro area, and 1% for the high yield on both sides of the Atlantic. To frame these values, consider that the historical average of the VaR was 1.08% for US investment grade and 0.28% for the Euro investment grade, while for US high yield it was 2.29% and 3.49% for Euro high yield.

Chart 6: Periods with VaR below 0.25%/0.10% for corporate investment grade


VaR of US/Euro corporate investment grade (one week, 99%) below 0.25%/0.10%, 1994-2020



Source: ICE Bofa ML, Bloomberg, author analysis. Data as at Sept. 25, 2020

Chart 7: Periods with VaR below 1% for high yield corporate

VaR of corporate Euro and US high yield (one week, 99%) below 1%, 1994-2020



Source: ICE Bofa ML, Bloomberg, author analysis. Data as at Sept. 25, 2020

This set of charts shows how the corporate bond world, despite rather compressed returns and more expensive valuations than in the past, is not discounting a level of optimism that we can consider excessive beyond doubt. It is a useful bit of information, because excess pessimism usually offers good buying opportunities, and vice versa excessive optimism, the opportunity to lighten positions. I can be proven wrong, but in my opinion, corporate bonds do not expose investors to a significant risk of excess optimism and complacency.

The methodologies to analyze markets and measure risks are constantly evolving. Hopefully we can learn from mistakes and improve and enrich our analytical tools. It is, in short, work in progress: a building site always open. We have the great advantage of not starting from scratch. We must be careful not to disperse it by confusing accurate, statistically-based, risk estimates with certainties.

Notes and references

1: It ain't what you don't know that gets you into trouble. It's what you know for sure that just ain't so.
For attribution information: <https://quoteinvestigator.com/2018/11/18/know-trouble/>

2: For the calculation of the Value at Risk (VaR) we have adopted the standard formula:
$$\text{VaR} = | \text{MV} \cdot Z\alpha \cdot \delta \cdot \sigma |$$

where δ is the coefficient that describes the sensitivity of the change in the market value of a position with respect to the underlying risk factor, with standard deviation σ . In our case MV (Market Value) is the value of the spread between YTW Corporate and Government Performance, $Z\alpha$ is the value of the normal distribution (-2.33 for 99% -1.64% for 95%). The sensitivity coefficient is the modified duration to worst of the considered corporate index and the standard deviation is calculated on the index's weekly total return. Thanks to Daniel Zanin for his support in the analysis and calculations.



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