



Invesco's Policy Statement on Global Corporate Governance and Proxy Voting

March 2019

I. Guiding Principles and Philosophy

Public companies hold shareholder meetings, attended by the company's executives, directors, and shareholders, during which important issues, such as appointments to the company's board of directors, executive compensation, and auditors, are addressed and where applicable, voted on. Proxy voting gives shareholders the opportunity to vote on issues that impact the company's operations and policies without being present at the meetings.

Invesco views proxy voting as an integral part of its investment management responsibilities and believes that the right to vote proxies should be managed with the same high standards of care and fiduciary duty to its clients as all other elements of the investment process. Invesco's proxy voting philosophy, governance structure and process are designed to ensure that proxy votes are cast in accordance with clients' best interests, which Invesco interprets to mean clients' best economic interests, this Policy and the operating guidelines and procedures of Invesco's regional investment centers.

Invesco investment teams vote proxies on behalf of Invesco-sponsored funds and non-fund advisory clients that have explicitly granted Invesco authority in writing to vote proxies on their behalf.

The proxy voting process at Invesco, which is driven by investment professionals, focuses on maximizing long-term value for our clients, protecting clients' rights and promoting governance structures and practices that reinforce the accountability of corporate management and boards of directors to shareholders. Invesco takes a nuanced approach to voting and, therefore, many matters to be voted upon are reviewed on a case by case basis.

Votes in favor of board or management proposals should not be interpreted as an indication of insufficient consideration by Invesco fund managers. Such votes may reflect the outcome of past or ongoing engagement and active ownership by Invesco with representatives of the companies in which we invest.

II. Applicability of this Policy

This Policy sets forth the framework of Invesco's corporate governance approach, broad philosophy and guiding principles that inform the proxy voting practices of Invesco's investment teams around the world. Given the different nature of these teams and their respective investment processes, as well as the significant differences in regulatory regimes and market practices across jurisdictions, not all aspects of this Policy may apply to all Invesco investment teams at all times. In the case of a conflict between this Policy and the operating guidelines and procedures of a regional investment center the latter will control.

III. Proxy Voting for Certain Fixed Income, Money Market Accounts and Index

For proxies held by certain client accounts managed in accordance with fixed income, money market and index strategies (including exchange traded funds), Invesco will typically vote in line with the majority holder of the active-equity shares held by Invesco outside of those strategies (“Majority Voting”). In this manner Invesco seeks to leverage the active-equity expertise and comprehensive proxy voting reviews conducted by teams employing active-equity strategies, which typically incorporate analysis of proxy issues as a core component of the investment process. Portfolio managers for accounts employing Majority Voting still retain full discretion to override Majority Voting and to vote the shares as they determine to be in the best interest of those accounts, absent certain types of conflicts of interest, which are discussed elsewhere in this Policy.

IV. Conflicts of Interest

There may be occasions where voting proxies may present a real or perceived conflict of interest between Invesco, as investment manager, and one or more of Invesco’s clients or vendors. Under Invesco’s Code of Conduct, Invesco entities and individuals are strictly prohibited from putting personal benefit, whether tangible or intangible, before the interests of clients. “Personal benefit” includes any intended benefit for Invesco, oneself or any other individual, company, group or organization of any kind whatsoever, except a benefit for the relevant Invesco client.

Firm-level Conflicts of Interest

A conflict of interest may exist if Invesco has a material business relationship with, or is actively soliciting business from, either the company soliciting a proxy or a third party that has a material interest in the outcome of a proxy vote or that is actively lobbying for a particular outcome of a proxy vote (*e.g.*, issuers that are distributors of Invesco’s products, or issuers that employ Invesco to manage portions of their retirement plans or treasury accounts). Invesco’s proxy governance team maintains a list of all such issuers for which a conflict of interest exists.

If the proposal that gives rise to the potential conflict is specifically addressed by this Policy or the operating guidelines and procedures of the relevant regional investment center, Invesco generally will vote the proxy in accordance therewith. Otherwise, based on a majority vote of its members, the Global IPAC (as described below) will vote the proxy.

Because this Policy and the operating guidelines and procedures of each regional investment center are pre-determined and crafted to be in the best economic interest of clients, applying them to vote client proxies should, in most instances, adequately resolve any potential conflict of interest. As an additional safeguard, persons from Invesco’s marketing, distribution and other customer-facing functions may not serve on the Global IPAC. For the avoidance of doubt, Invesco may not consider Invesco Ltd.’s pecuniary interest when voting proxies on behalf of clients.

Personal Conflicts of Interest

A conflict also may exist where an Invesco employee has a known personal relationship with other proponents of proxy proposals, participants in proxy contests, corporate directors, or candidates for directorships.

All Invesco personnel with proxy voting responsibilities are required to report any known personal conflicts of interest regarding proxy issues with which they are involved. In such instances, the individual(s) with the conflict will be excluded from the decision-making process relating to such issues.

Other Conflicts of Interest

To avoid any appearance of a conflict of interest, Invesco will not vote proxies issued by, or related to matters involving, Invesco Ltd. that may be held in client accounts from time to time.¹ Shares of an Invesco-sponsored fund held by other Invesco funds will be voted in the same proportion as the votes of external shareholders of the underlying fund.

V. Use of Third-Party Proxy Advisory Services

Invesco may supplement its internal research with information from third-parties, such as proxy advisory firms. However, Invesco generally retains full and independent discretion with respect to proxy voting decisions.

As part of its fiduciary obligation to clients, Invesco performs extensive initial and ongoing due diligence on the proxy advisory firms it engages. This includes reviews of information regarding the capabilities of their research staffs and internal controls, policies and procedures, including those relating to possible conflicts of interest. In addition, Invesco regularly monitors and communicates with these firms and monitors their compliance with Invesco's performance and policy standards.

VI. Global Proxy Voting Platform and Administration

Guided by its philosophy that investment teams should manage proxy voting, Invesco has created the Global Invesco Proxy Advisory Committee ("Global IPAC"). The Global IPAC is a global investments-driven committee comprised of representatives from various investment management teams and Invesco's Global Head of Proxy Governance and Responsible Investment ("Head of Proxy Governance"). The Global IPAC provides a forum for investment teams to monitor, understand and discuss key proxy issues and voting trends within the Invesco complex. Absent a conflict of interest, the Global IPAC representatives, in consultation with the respective investment team, are responsible for voting proxies for the securities the team manages (unless such responsibility is explicitly delegated to the portfolio managers of the securities in question) In addition to the Global IPAC, for some clients, third parties (e.g., U.S. mutual fund boards) provide oversight of the proxy process. The Global IPAC and Invesco's proxy administration and governance team, compliance and legal teams regularly communicate and review this Policy and the operating guidelines and procedures of each regional investment center to ensure that they remain consistent with clients' best interests, regulatory requirements, governance trends and industry best practices.

Invesco maintains a proprietary global proxy administration platform, known as the "fund manager portal" and supported by the Head of Proxy Governance and a dedicated team of internal proxy

¹ Generally speaking, Invesco does not invest for its clients in the shares of Invesco Ltd., however, limited exceptions apply in the case of funds or accounts designed to track an index that includes Invesco Ltd. as a component.

specialists. The platform streamlines the proxy voting and ballot reconciliation processes, as well as related functions, such as share blocking and managing conflicts of interest issuers. Managing these processes internally, as opposed to relying on third parties, gives Invesco greater quality control, oversight and independence in the proxy administration process.

The platform also includes advanced global reporting and record-keeping capabilities regarding proxy matters that enable Invesco to satisfy client, regulatory and management requirements. Historical proxy voting information, including commentary by investment professionals regarding the votes they cast, where applicable, is stored to build institutional knowledge across the Invesco complex with respect to individual companies and proxy issues. Certain investment teams also use the platform to access third-party proxy research.

VII. Non-Votes

In the great majority of instances, Invesco can vote proxies successfully. However, in certain circumstances Invesco may refrain from voting where the economic or other opportunity costs of voting exceeds any anticipated benefits of that proxy proposal. In addition, there may be instances in which Invesco is unable to vote all of its clients' proxies despite using commercially reasonable efforts to do so. For example:

- Invesco may not receive proxy materials from the relevant fund or client custodian with sufficient time and information to make an informed independent voting decision. In such cases, Invesco may choose not to vote, to abstain from voting, to vote in line with management or to vote in accordance with proxy advisor recommendations. These matters are left to the discretion of the fund manager.
- If the security in question is on loan as part of a securities lending program, Invesco may determine that the benefit to the client of voting a particular proxy is outweighed by the revenue that would be lost by terminating the loan and recalling the securities.
- In some countries the exercise of voting rights imposes temporary transfer restrictions on the related securities ("share blocking"). Invesco generally refrains from voting proxies in share-blocking countries unless Invesco determines that the benefit to the client(s) of voting a specific proxy outweighs the client's temporary inability to sell the security.
- Some companies require a representative to attend meetings in person to vote a proxy. In such cases, Invesco may determine that the costs of sending a representative or signing a power-of-attorney outweigh the benefit of voting a particular proxy.

VIII. Proxy Voting Guidelines

The following guidelines describe Invesco's general positions on various common proxy voting issues. This list is not intended to be exhaustive or prescriptive. As noted above, Invesco's proxy process is investor-driven, and each fund manager retains ultimate discretion to vote proxies in the manner they deem most appropriate, consistent with Invesco's proxy voting principles and philosophy discussed in Sections I through IV. Individual proxy votes therefore will differ from these guidelines from time to time.

Invesco generally affords management discretion with respect to the operation of a company's business, and will generally support a board's discretion on proposals relating to ordinary business practices and routine matters, unless there is insufficient information to decide about the nature of the proposal.

Invesco generally abstains from voting on or opposes proposals that are "bundled" or made contingent on each other (*e.g.*, proposals to elect directors and approve compensation plans) where there is insufficient information to decide about the nature of the proposals.

A. Shareholder Access and Treatment of Shareholder Proposals – General

Invesco reviews on a case by case basis but generally votes in favor of proposals that would increase shareholders' opportunities to express their views to boards of directors, proposals that would lower barriers to shareholder action, and proposals to promote the adoption of generally accepted best practices in corporate governance, provided that such proposals would not require a disproportionate amount of management attention or corporate resources or otherwise that may inappropriately disrupt the company's business and main purpose, usually set out in their reporting disclosures and business model. Likewise, Invesco reviews on a case by case basis but generally votes for shareholder proposals that are designed to protect shareholder rights if a company's corporate governance standards indicate that such additional protections are warranted (for example, where minority shareholders' rights are not adequately protected).

i.

B. Environmental, Social and Corporate Responsibility Issues

Invesco believes that a company's long-term response to environmental, social and corporate responsibility issues can significantly affect its long-term shareholder value. We recognize that to manage a corporation effectively, directors and management may consider not only the interests of shareholders, but also the interests of employees, customers, suppliers, creditors and the local community, among others. While Invesco generally affords management discretion with respect to the operation of a company's business, Invesco generally will evaluate proposals relating to environmental, social and corporate responsibility issues on a case by case basis and will vote on those proposals in a manner intended to maximize long-term shareholder value. Invesco may choose, however, to abstain on voting on proposals relating to environmental, social and corporate responsibility issues.

Invesco reviews on a case by case basis but generally supports the following proposals relating to these issues:

- Gender pay gap proposals
- Political contributions disclosure/political lobbying disclosure/political activities and action
- Data security, privacy, and internet issues

- Report on climate change/climate change action
- Gender diversity on public boards

C. Capitalization Structure Issues

i. Stock Issuances

Invesco generally supports a board's decisions about the need for additional capital stock to meet ongoing corporate needs, except where the request could adversely affect Invesco clients' ownership stakes or voting rights. Some capitalization proposals, such as those to authorize common or preferred stock with special voting rights or to issue additional stock in connection with an acquisition, may require additional analysis. Invesco generally opposes proposals to issue additional stock without preemptive rights, as those issuances do not permit shareholders to share proportionately in any new issues of stock of the same class. Invesco generally opposes proposals to authorize classes of preferred stock with unspecified voting, conversion, dividend or other rights ("blank check" stock) when they appear to be intended as an anti-takeover mechanism; such issuances may be supported when used for general financing purposes.

ii. Stock Splits

Invesco generally supports a board's proposal to increase common share authorization for a stock split, provided that the increase in authorized shares would not result in excessive dilution given the company's industry and performance in terms of shareholder returns.

iii. Share Repurchases

Invesco generally supports a board's proposal to institute open-market share repurchase plans only if all shareholders participate on an equal basis.

D. Corporate Governance Issues

i. General

Invesco reviews on a case by case basis but generally supports the following proposals related to governance matters:

- Adopt proxy access right
- Require independent board chairperson
- Provide right to call special meetings
- Provide right to act by written consent
- Submit shareholder rights plan (poison pill) to shareholder vote
- Reduce supermajority vote requirement

- Remove antitakeover provisions
- Declassify the board of directors
- Require a majority vote for election of directors
- Require majority of independent directors on the board
- Approve executive appointment
- Adopt exclusive forum provision

Invesco generally supports a board's discretion to amend a company's articles concerning routine matters, such as formalities relating to shareholder meetings. Invesco generally opposes non-routine amendments to a company's articles if any of the proposed amendments would limit shareholders' rights or there is insufficient information to decide about the nature of the proposal.

ii. Board of Directors

1. *Director Nominees in Uncontested Elections*

Subject to the other considerations described below, in an uncontested director election for a company without a controlling shareholder, Invesco generally votes in favor of the director slate if it is comprised of at least a majority of independent directors and if the board's key committees are fully independent, effective and balanced. Key committees include the audit, compensation/remuneration and governance/nominating committees. Invesco's standard of independence excludes directors who, in addition to the directorship, have any material business or family relationships with the companies they serve.

2. *Director Nominees in Contested Elections*

Invesco recognizes that short-term investment sentiments influence the corporate governance landscape and may influence companies in Invesco clients' portfolios and more broadly across the market. Invesco recognizes that short-term investment sentiment may conflict with long-term value creation and as such looks at each proxy contest matter on a case by case basis, considering factors such as:

- Long-term financial performance of the company relative to its industry,
- Management's track record,
- Background to the proxy contest,
- Qualifications of director nominees (both slates),
- Evaluation of what each side is offering shareholders as well as the likelihood that the proposed objectives and goals can be met, and

- Stock ownership positions in the company.

3. *Director Accountability*

Invesco generally withholds votes from directors who exhibit a lack of accountability to shareholders. Examples include, without limitation, poor attendance (less than 75%, absent extenuating circumstances) at meetings, director “overboarding” (as described below), failing to implement shareholder proposals that have received a majority of votes and/or by adopting or approving egregious corporate-governance or other policies. In cases of material financial restatements, accounting fraud, habitually late filings, adopting shareholder rights plan (“poison pills”) without shareholder approval, or other areas of poor performance, Invesco may withhold votes from some or all of a company’s directors. Invesco generally supports shareholder proposals relating to the competence of directors that are in the best interest of the company’s performance and the interest of its shareholders. In situations where directors’ performance is a concern, Invesco may also support shareholder proposals to take corrective actions such as so-called “clawback” provisions.

Invesco generally withholds votes from directors who serve on an excessive number of boards of directors (“overboarding”). Examples of overboarding may include when (i) a non-executive director is sitting on more than six public company boards, and (ii) a CEO is sitting on the board of more than two public companies besides the CEO’s own company, excluding the boards of majority-owned subsidiaries of the parent company.

4. *Director Independence*

Invesco generally supports proposals to require a majority of directors to be independent unless particular circumstances make this not feasible or in the best interests of shareholders. We generally vote for proposals that would require the board’s audit, compensation/remuneration, and/or governance/nominating committees to be composed exclusively of independent directors since this minimizes the potential for conflicts of interest.

5. *Director Indemnification*

Invesco recognizes that individuals may be reluctant to serve as corporate directors if they are personally liable for all related lawsuits and legal costs. As a result, reasonable limitations on directors’ liability can benefit a company and its shareholders by helping to attract and retain qualified directors while preserving recourse for shareholders in the event of misconduct by directors. Accordingly, unless there is insufficient information to make a decision about the nature of the proposal, Invesco will generally support a board’s discretion regarding proposals to limit directors’ liability and provide indemnification and/or exculpation, provided that the arrangements are limited to the director acting honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the company and, in criminal matters, are limited to the director having reasonable grounds for believing the conduct was lawful.

6. *Separate Chairperson and CEO*

Invesco evaluates these proposals on a case by case basis, recognizing that good governance requires either an independent chair or a qualified, proactive, and lead independent director.

Voting decisions may consider, among other factors, the presence or absence of:

- a designated lead director, appointed from the ranks of the independent board members, with an established term of office and clearly delineated powers and duties;
- a majority of independent directors;
- completely independent key committees;
- committee chairpersons nominated by the independent directors;
- CEO performance reviewed annually by a committee of independent directors; and
- established governance guidelines.

7. *Majority/Supermajority/Cumulative Voting for Directors*

The right to elect directors is the single most important mechanism shareholders have to promote accountability. Invesco generally votes in favor of proposals to elect directors by a majority vote. Except in cases where required by law in the jurisdiction of incorporation or when a company has adopted formal governance principles that present a meaningful alternative to the majority voting standard, Invesco generally votes against actions that would impose any supermajority voting requirement, and generally supports actions to dismantle existing supermajority requirements.

The practice of cumulative voting can enable minority shareholders to have representation on a company's board. Invesco generally opposes such proposals as unnecessary where the company has adopted a majority voting standard. However, Invesco generally supports proposals to institute the practice of cumulative voting at companies whose overall corporate-governance standards indicate a particular need to protect the interests of minority shareholders.

8. *Staggered Boards/Annual Election of Directors*

Invesco generally supports proposals to elect each director annually rather than electing directors to staggered multi-year terms because annual elections increase a board's level of accountability to its shareholders.

9. *Board Size*

Invesco believes that the number of directors is an important factor to consider when evaluating the board's ability to maximize long-term shareholder value. Invesco approaches proxies relating to board size on a case by case basis but generally will defer to the board with respect to determining the optimal number of board members, provided that the proposed board size is sufficiently large to represent shareholder interests and sufficiently limited to remain effective.

10. Director Term Limits and Retirement Age

Invesco believes it is important for a board of directors to examine its membership regularly with a view to ensuring that the company continues to benefit from a diversity of director viewpoints and experience. We generally believe that an individual board's nominating committee is best positioned to determine whether director term limits would be an appropriate measure to help achieve these goals and, if so, the nature of such limits. Invesco generally opposes proposals to limit the tenure of outside directors through mandatory retirement ages.

iii. Audit Committees and Auditors

1. Qualifications of Audit Committee and Auditors

Invesco believes a company's Audit Committee has a high degree of responsibility to shareholders in matters of financial disclosure, integrity of the financial statements and effectiveness of a company's internal controls. Independence, experience and financial expertise are critical elements of a well-functioning Audit Committee. When electing directors who are members of a company's Audit Committee, or when ratifying a company's auditors, Invesco considers the past performance of the Audit Committee and holds its members accountable for the quality of the company's financial statements and reports.

2. Auditor Indemnifications

A company's independent auditors play a critical role in ensuring and attesting to the integrity of the company's financial statements. It is therefore essential that they perform their work in accordance with the highest standards. Invesco generally opposes proposals that would limit the liability of or indemnify auditors because doing so could serve to undermine this obligation.

3. Adequate Disclosure of Auditor Fees

Understanding the fees earned by the auditors is important for assessing auditor independence. Invesco's support for the re-appointment of the auditors will take into consideration the availability of adequate disclosure concerning the amount and nature of audit versus non-audit fees. Invesco generally will support proposals that call for this disclosure if it is not already being made.

E. Remuneration and Incentives

Invesco believes properly constructed compensation plans that include equity ownership are effective in creating incentives that induce management and employees of portfolio companies to create greater shareholder wealth. Invesco generally supports equity compensation plans that promote the proper alignment of incentives with shareholders' long-term interests, and generally votes against plans that are overly dilutive to existing shareholders, plans that contain objectionable structural features, and plans that appear likely to reduce the value of the client's investment.

i. Independent Compensation/Remuneration Committee

Invesco believes that an independent, experienced and well-informed compensation/remuneration committee is critical to ensuring that a company's remuneration practices align with shareholders' interests and, therefore, generally supports proposals calling for a compensation/remuneration committee to be comprised solely of independent directors.

ii. Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation

Invesco believes that an independent compensation/remuneration committee of the board, with input from management, is generally best positioned to determine the appropriate components and levels of executive compensation, as well as the appropriate frequency of related shareholder advisory votes. This is particularly the case where shareholders can express their views on remuneration matters through annual votes for or against the election of the individual directors who comprise the compensation/remuneration committee. Invesco, therefore, generally will support management's recommendations regarding the components and levels of executive compensation and the frequency of shareholder advisory votes on executive compensation. However, Invesco will vote against such recommendations where Invesco determines that a company's executive remuneration policies are not properly aligned with shareholder interests or may create inappropriate incentives for management.

iii. Equity Based Compensation Plans

Invesco generally votes against plans that contain structural features that would impair the alignment of incentives between shareholders and management. Such features include, without limitation, the ability to reprice or reload options without shareholder approval, the ability to issue options below the stock's current market price, or the ability to replenish shares automatically without shareholder approval.

iv. Severance Arrangements

Invesco considers proposed severance arrangements (sometimes known as "golden parachute" arrangements) on a case-by-case basis due to the wide variety among their terms. Invesco acknowledges that in some cases such arrangements, if reasonable, may be in shareholders' best interests as a method of attracting and retaining high quality executive talent. Invesco generally votes in favor of proposals requiring advisory shareholder ratification of senior executives' severance agreements while generally opposing proposals that require such agreements to be ratified by shareholders in advance of their adoption.

v. "Claw Back" Provisions

Invesco generally supports so called "claw back" policies intended to recoup remuneration paid to senior executives based upon materially inaccurate financial reporting (as evidenced by later restatements) or fraudulent accounting or business practices.

vi. Employee Stock Purchase Plans

Invesco generally supports employee stock purchase plans that are reasonably designed to provide proper incentives to a broad base of employees, provided that the price at which employees may acquire stock represents a reasonable discount from the market price.

F. Anti-Takeover Defenses

Measures designed to protect a company from unsolicited bids can adversely affect shareholder value and voting rights, and they have the potential to create conflicts of interests among directors, management and shareholders. Such measures include adopting or renewing shareholder rights plans (“poison pills”), requiring supermajority voting on certain corporate actions, classifying the election of directors instead of electing each director to an annual term, or creating separate classes of common or preferred stock with special voting rights. In determining whether to support a proposal to add, eliminate or restrict anti-takeover measures, Invesco will examine the elements of the proposal to assess the degree to which it would adversely affect shareholder rights of adopted. Invesco generally supports shareholder proposals directing companies to subject their anti-takeover provisions to a shareholder vote, as well as the following proposals:

- Provide right to act by written consent
- Provide right to call special meetings
- Adopt fair price provision
- Approve control share acquisition

Invesco generally opposes payments by companies to minority shareholders intended to dissuade such shareholders from pursuing a takeover or another change (sometimes known as “greenmail”) because these payments result in preferential treatment of some shareholders over others.

Companies occasionally require shareholder approval to engage in certain corporate actions or transactions such as mergers, acquisitions, name changes, dissolutions, reorganizations, divestitures and reincorporations. Invesco generally determines its votes for these types of corporate actions after a careful evaluation of the proposal. Generally, Invesco will support proposals to approve different types of restructurings that provide the necessary financing to save the company from involuntary bankruptcy. However, Invesco will generally oppose proposals to change a company’s corporate form or to “go dark” (*i.e.*, going private transactions) without shareholder approval.

Reincorporation involves re-establishing the company in a different legal jurisdiction. Invesco generally will vote for proposals to reincorporate a company if the board and management have demonstrated sound financial or business reasons for the move. Invesco generally will oppose proposals to reincorporate if they are solely part of an anti-takeover defense or intended to limit directors’ liability.

Invesco will generally support proposals that ask the board to consider non-shareholder constituencies or other non-financial effects when evaluating a merger or business combination.